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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, two tax developments sent shockwaves throughout the
family office community. First, the Tax Court, in Lender Management v.
Commissioner, held that a multi-generational family office was a trade
or business and could take above-the-line deductions for operating expenses it incurred.1 Second, Congress passed the 2017 Tax Act (commonly known as “TCJA”2) which disallowed operating expenses for
taxpayers engaged in a profit-seeking activity like investing.3 Before the
TCJA, taxpayers had an incentive to argue they were engaged in a trade
or business: expenses would be fully deductible if they were and limited
if they were only engaged in a profit-seeking activity.4 But the combination of Lender and the 2017 Tax Act made that incentive even greater
for family offices.5
1

Lender Mgmt., LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2017-246, 114 T.C.M. (CCH) 638

(2017).
2 That said, TCJA was not the Bill’s official name. See Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat.
2054 (2017) (noting that the official name of the bill is “An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year
2018”).
3 See id. § 11045 (disallowing a taxpayer from taking a section 67(a) miscellaneous
itemized deduction, which included section 212 deductions for a taxpayer incurred expenses in connection with a profit-seeking activity).
4 Compare I.R.C. § 162 (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business . . . .”), with I.R.C. § 67(a) (“In the case of an individual, the miscellaneous
itemized deductions for any taxable year shall be allowed only to the extent that the
aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2 percent of adjusted gross income.”).
5 See Farhad Aghdami & Michelle L. Harris, IRS Gets “Bageled” in Tax Court
Over Family Office Expenses, WILLIAMS MULLEN (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.williams
mullen.com/news/irs-gets-%E2%80%9Cbageled%E2%80%9D-tax-court-over-family-office-expenses-1 (“[The Lender] decision is particularly notable because it affirms the ability of a family office to be respected as a trade or business for federal income tax
purposes—an ability that is particularly important under the new tax reform legislation.”); Mark Leeds, New Tax Case Provides Guidance on Deductions for Fees Incurred
by Family Offices, MAYER BROWN (2018), https://www.mayerbrown.com/-/media/files/
perspectives-events/publications/2018/01/new-tax-case-provides-guidance-on-deductionsfor-f/files/update-guidance-deductions-family-offices/fileattachment/update-guidance-deductions-family-offices.pdf (noting that The TCJA (i.e., the Section 11045 repeal of the
miscellaneous itemized deductions) puts “an even more important significance” on “the
distinction between business expenses and investment expenses.”).
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In response to this incentive, law firms and accounting firms have
encouraged clients to create structures like the taxpayer’s structure in
Lender.6 The cost savings associated with a Lender structure were and
remain substantial.7 Family members investing through a family office
structure now can take immediate ordinary income tax deductions yet
pay tax at the preferential long-term capital gains rate.8 Because family
offices are implementing this structure at a rapid pace, a thorough understanding of the core issues in Lender is timely and necessary.
The theoretical starting point for this discussion is an analysis of
whether a family office is a trade or business. The Supreme Court long
ago established “[n]o matter how large the estate or how continuous or
extended the work required may be,” a taxpayer who solely manages
investments for himself will not be engaged in the trade or business of
investing.9 Courts have since only drawn two exceptions: when the taxpayer acts as a conduit for investors (dealer) or derives profits from active trading (trader).10 Some courts have created a third exception for
private equity and venture capital funds even though these taxpayers
fall somewhere between the dealer and investor label. The Lender court
eschewed the traditional trade or business test, finding instead that the
family office was a trade or business because it operated like a traditional investment fund and received a profits interest for the services it
performed.
6 See, e.g., Aghdami & Harris, supra note 5; Leeds, supra note 5; Amy E. Heller &
Ivan Taback, Impact of New US Tax Law on High Net Worth Individuals, Trusts and
Family Offices, SKADDEN (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/
2018/01/2018-insights/impact-of-new-us-tax-law; Anchin Alert, Tax Court Ruling That
Family Office Carried on a Trade or Business May Offer Tax Planning Opportunities,
ANCHIN, BLOCK & ANCHIN LLP (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.anchin.com/uploads/1413/
doc/Alert_02052018_Tax-FamilyOffice-FS.pdf; Newsletter: Private Investment & Family
Office Insights, The Profits Interest Family Office Structure, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
(Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.kirkland.com/-/media/publications/newsletter/2018/09/private-investment-family-office-insights/privateinvestmentfamilyofficeinsights92518.pdf.
7 KIRKLAND & ELLIS, supra note 6 (“Depending on the size of the family office
and number of existing entities, implementing the profits interest family office structure
can be complicated, although the benefits usually well outweigh the cost.”).
8 A third prong of the Lender decision is that by putting assets into a family partnership structure, the estates of the individuals who own a beneficial interest in the family
partnerships will pay less in estate tax. Lender Mgmt., LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2017246, 114 T.C.M. (CCH) 638 (2017). A discount of 10-20% is common in these situations.
See generally Louis A. Mezzullo, Wealth Planning with Family Limited Partnerships and
Limited Liability Companies, 722 TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS (BNA), at I.C. (acknowledging the potential estate tax benefit of putting assets in an investment LLC, similar to what
the Lender family did, but not discussing this potential benefit).
9 Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941).
10 See infra Part II.A.
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While the Lender decision was no doubt a positive one for taxpayers, some family offices may not celebrate that decision as much as one
would expect. First, a few aspects of the Tax Court’s decision are not
persuasive. Future courts may find the court’s analysis of the family office’s profit interest structure was lacking relative to the varied ways in
which a family office can create a profits interest. Courts may also adopt
a different standard from which to evaluate the trade or business question. These points are even more important because Lender is a memorandum opinion and has no precedential value.
Second, the Lender decision was narrow. This paper lists four reasons why the Lender structure may not be the panacea for every family
office: some family offices don’t have as favorable facts as the Lender
taxpayer; some family offices will be unable to fall under an exemption
from securities registration; a family office’s profits interest may create
other unintended tax consequences; and family investment partnerships
will still be unable to deduct investment expenses. These reasons do not
diminish the benefit of the Lender structure. Instead, these issues reflect
significant concerns that every lawyer and family office executive needs
to consider before jumping into the fray with their own Lender
structure.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II describes the sometimesamorphous distinction between dealers, investors, and traders. It also
provides a brief case study of private equity funds. Part III discusses the
Lender family office structure and the Lender decision. Part IV discusses the implications of the case for future family offices and courts
looking at the issue. Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Dealer, Trader, Investor
Lots of people buy, sell, and hold investments for many purposes
and in many roles. Tax law separates these people into three categories:
dealers, taxpayers like stockbrokers who help facilitate investments; investors, people with other jobs who invest their own money for personal
gain; and traders, people in the profession of trading because they trade
with more frequency and exploit short-term gains.11 Though not found
in the Code, these labels provide a useful shorthand for the tax consequences of the activities of the taxpayer.12 This distinction is not pedagogical. As this section explores, whether a taxpayer is a dealer, trader,
11 Shu-Yi Oei, A Structural Critique of Trader Taxation, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 1013,
1016–17 (2008).
12 BORIS BITTKER I. & LAWRENCE LOKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 47.2 (Thomson Reuters/Tax & Acct. eds., 2d/3d ed. 2019) (discussing
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or investor may have significant consequences on whether the person
can deduct investment expenses incurred in generating the income.
1.

Dealer—A Merchant of Securities

A dealer is a “a merchant of securities” who “buys securities and
sells them to customers with a view to the gains and profits that may be
derived therefrom.”13 Essentially, the dealer “seek[s] to profit on the
resale of those securities at marked up prices.”14 For example, a dealer
is a business that, in its “ordinary course,” may offer interest rate or
currency swaps to customers.15 As the next sub-section will show, some
argue that private equity and venture capital funds are also “dealers”
because they act as a party who buys securities on behalf of investors in
hopes that the funds will sell the investments at a higher price in the
future.16
There are three primary tax characteristics of this label. First, because dealers sell securities “to customers,” the securities in which they
deal are not capital assets under section 1221(a)(1), and the dealers
therefore need to pay tax at an ordinary income tax rate. Second, dealers need “to recognize gain or loss annually on a mark-to-market basis
on their securities inventories and other securities not held for investment.”17 Third, dealers are in the trade or business of dealing securities
and can deduct business expenses under section 162, which means that
these losses can offset ordinary tax income and are not limited.
2. Trader—Frequent, Regular, and Continuous Activity
A trader manages a portfolio like a business with regularity and
frequency. The term “refers to those individuals who actively buy and
sell securities held over the short term for their own account, such as
individuals who engage in online trading of stocks and securities.”18
Much like a dealer, the trader is engaged in a “trade or business” for his
activities in buying and selling securities.
Traders, like dealers, can deduct business expenses under section
162 and often hold capital assets. Even so, because traders usually deal
securities with great frequency—i.e., buy and sell the same security
within a matter of days or weeks—they often need to recognize shorthow the dealer and trader distinction is a label associated with the expense because
neither term appears in section 1221).
13 Oei, supra note 11, at 1017 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.471-5).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1064 (citing I.R.C. § 1.475).
16 See infra Part II.B.1.
17 BITTKER & LOKEN, supra note 12, ¶ 107.8.
18 Oei, supra note 11, at 1017-18.
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term capital gains and pay tax at the higher, ordinary income tax rates.
Additionally, traders can “mark to market” their securities under section 475(f) so that the trader can recognize unrealized income and losses
from their trading every year.
Although the line between trader and investor can be blurry, Professor Oei distillated the difference into two essential traits. First, traders engage in activity that is “frequent, regular, and continuous enough
to so qualify” as a trade or business.19 For example, one taxpayer in
Fuld v. Commissioner made “about 249 sales of securities held for more
than two years and about 98 sales of securities for two years or less” and
“devoted an average of eight hours a day to studying texts and services,
charting prices, conferring with his broker, attending meetings, and consulting corporate executives.”20 Likewise the taxpayer in Mayer v. Commissioner engaged in “substantial” activities where he “had over 1,100
executed sales and purchases in each of the years at issue.”21 But the
taxpayer in Chen v. Commissioner was not a trader, in part because he
made 94% of his trades “between February and April, and no transactions occurred in six of the other nine months of the tax year.”22
Second, Professor Oei said that traders must intend to make a
short-term profit from the holding, buying, or selling the securities involved.23 In summarizing the distinction between a trader and an investor, the court in Moller v. Commissioner said that a trader must engage
in activities “directed to short-term trading, not the long-term holding of
investments, and income must be principally derived from the sale of
securities rather than from dividends and interest paid on those
securities.”24
The seminal case of Commissioner v. Groetzinger, which held that a
professional gambler—whose sole wages derived from gambling—was
engaged in a trade or business, highlights the short-term aspect of the
trader distinction.25 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the tax-

19

Id. at 1032.
Id. (quoting Fuld v. Comm’r, 139 F.2d 465, 485–89 (2d Cir. 1943)).
21 Id. (quoting Mayer v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-209, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2949,
2949-4, -5 (1994)).
22 Id. (citing Chen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-132, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1388
(2004)).
23 Id. at 1035.
24 Id. at 1036 (citing Moller v. Comm’r, 721 F.2d 810, 813 (1983)).
25 480 U.S. 23 (1987). Although the Court did not directly adopt this dealer-traderinvestor label, it implied that the distinction was relevant. Id. at 28 (noting that “the
Court appears to have drawn a distinction between an active trader and an investor”).
20
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payer was engaged in a trade or business, despite its unconventionality.26 The Court rationalized the case as follows:
We accept the fact that to be engaged in a trade or business,
the taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity
and regularity and that the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit. A sporadic
activity, a hobby, or an amusement diversion does not
qualify.27
The Court also cleared one misconception that taxpayers seemed to
struggle with after Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in DuPont:28
a trader need not trade to customers.29 Traders need not sell securities
on behalf or to another entity. What is important is that the taxpayer
“must be involved in the activity with continuity and regularity and that
the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for
income or profit.”30 In other words, traders need not sell to anyone;
they may be engaged in a trade or business simply by buying and selling
securities using their own personal funds.
3. Investor—Infrequently Purchasing Securities Using Your Own
Money
Someone who buys and holds securities is not a dealer or a trader,
but an investor. An investor holds an investment “for investment or
speculation,” does not hold itself out as a merchant of securities, and
does not engage in trading activities with the regularity to make himself
a trader.31 For example, a lawyer who works forty-hours a week at a law
firm and spends one-hour a week “managing his portfolio” is likely an
26 Id. at 33 (“If a taxpayer . . . devotes his full-time activity to gambling, and it is his
intended livelihood source, it would seem that basic concepts of fairness . . . demand that
his activity be regarded as a trade or business just as any other readily accepted activity
. . . .”).
27 Id. at 36.
28 Id. at 29 (citing Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)); see also F. Ladson Boyle, What Is A Trade or Business?, 39 TAX LAW. 737,
762 (1986) (noting that in the pre-Groetzinger context, “the goods or services test of
Justice Frankfurter is the hardest to justify” because although it is “reasonably objective,
in operation, it has little effect and can produce unfair results”).
29 Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 34 (“We are not satisfied that the Frankfurter gloss
would add any helpful dimension to the resolution of cases such as this one, or that it
provides a ‘sensible test. . . .’ It might assist now and then, when the answer is obvious
and positive, but it surely is capable of breeding litigation over the meaning of ‘goods,’
the meaning of ‘services,’ or the meaning of ‘holding one’s self out.’ And we suspect
that—apart from gambling—almost every activity would satisfy the gloss.”).
30 Id. at 35.
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-5(c).
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investor when he manages his portfolio.32 Unlike dealers and traders,
investors do not have a trade or business.
Investors’ tax characteristics are both better and worse of that of a
dealer or trader. First, investors hold capital assets because the investor
does not sell “to customers.” Because section 1221 works as an exclusionary rule (saying a capital asset is any asset not explicitly listed in the
statute) and because none of the exceptions under the rule apply, investors will pay income tax at a preferential capital gains tax rate. Second,
although the tax treatment of income is more beneficial to investors,
investors have a worse tax treatment for losses. Individuals and corporations are limited in the investment losses that they can deduct.33 Third,
investors are typically not in the trade or business of investing securities
and thus cannot deduct business expenses under section 162. Investors
can deduct expenses under section 212, but the TCJA limited the ability
of investors to deduct these expenses until 2026.34
The prototypical investor is the taxpayer in Higgins v. Commissioner,35 a case that held that someone managing investments for his
own family does not have a trade or business.36 The Court noted that
the investor had “extensive investments in real estate, bonds and stocks,
devoted a considerable portion of his time to the oversight of his interests and hired others to assist him in offices rented for that purpose.”37
The taxpayer argued that his actions were more like a trader—that “‘elements of continuity, constant repetition, regularity and extent’ differentiate his activities from the occasional like actions of the small
investor.”38 The Court rejected his argument: “[n]o matter how large
the estate or how continuous or extended the work required may be,”
an investor does not have a trade or business when he “merely kept
records and collected interest and dividends from his securities, through
managerial attention for his investments.”39
32

GREGG POLSKY, Income Tax, in STAY AHEAD OF THE PACK: YOUR COMPREHENGUIDE TO THE UPPER LEVEL CURRICULUM 443 (2018).
33 See I.R.C. § 1211.
34 See Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11045, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017); I.R.C. § 67(g).
35 312 U.S. 212, 216-17 (1941). The taxpayer in Synder also exemplifies a typical
investor. The taxpayer in that case was a “salaried secretary” who made a series of margin trades and tried to argue that he was in a trade or business. See Snyder v. Comm’r,
295 U.S. 134, 139 (1935). The Court rejected his argument, noting that he did not “make
a living in buying and selling securities” and only tried to take “advantage of the turns of
the market” by increasing his margin “as great an extent as the margin of his account
permitted.” Id. In other words, the taxpayer in Synder was not a trader because he did
not engage in enough regular activity to gain the trader label.
36 Higgins, 312 U.S. at 218.
37 Id. at 213.
38 Id. at 215.
39 Id. at 218.
SIVE
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The Court reaffirmed its position in Whipple, in which it denied a
taxpayer from taking certain business losses because the taxpayer was
not engaged in a trade or business.40 There, the Court explained that
devoting one’s time and energies to the affairs of a corporation
is not of itself, and without more, a trade or business of the
person so engaged. Though such activities may produce income, profit or gain in the form of dividends or enhancement
in the value of an investment, this return is distinctive to the
process of investing and is generated by the successful operation of the corporation’s business as distinguished from the
trade or business of the taxpayer himself. When the only return
is that of an investor, the taxpayer has not satisfied his burden of
demonstrating that he is engaged in a trade or business since
investing is not a trade or business and the return to the taxpayer, though substantially the product of his services, legally
arises not from his own trade or business but from that of the
corporation.41
Even though the Supreme Court decided Higgins over eighty years ago
and before the enactment of section 212, the Court highlighted its significance in Groetzinger. There, the Court did
not overrule or cut back on the Court’s holding in Higgins when we conclude that if one’s gambling activity is pursued full time, in good faith, and with regularity, to the
production of income for a livelihood, and is not a mere hobby,
it is a trade or business within the meaning of the statutes with
which we are here concerned.42
Put another way, Higgins is still and has always been good law. Someone managing investments for their personal account or their family will
not be engaged in a trade or business unless that taxpayer’s activity rises
to the level of a trader.
But some lawyers seem to think that this analysis changes for C
corporations because there is a presumption that a C corporation has a
trade or business. More precisely, lawyers and accountants point to Revenue Ruling 78-195, in which the IRS said that a corporation “that was
formed for the express purpose of investing in real property purchased a
tract of unimproved, non-income-producing real property, which it held
for two years and sold without having made any substantial improve40
41
42

Whipple v. Comm’r, 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987).
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ment” was eligible to take a section 162 deduction for its expenses.43
The ruling stated that the “the corporation did not make any significant
efforts to sell the property and did not engage in any other transactions
in real or personal property or in other commercial activities.”44 In
other words, the corporation likely was not a dealer or trader, but the
IRS still said that the entity was in a trade or business; ergo, tax practitioners rationalize that the trade or business analysis must differ for C
corporations.
But the problem with this logic is that it does not come from any
statute or case. Instead, the main support for this argument comes from
a Revenue Ruling that was scant on analysis and rationale. It is likely
that a court will not defer to this ruling as it lacks any “power to persuade” given its inconsistency with the general case law regarding trade
or business.45 Additionally, whatever presumption existed in pre-TCJA
(when the corporate tax rate was 35%) likely does not exist today (when
the corporate tax rate is 21%). If a corporation reinvests its profits, it is
possible that a taxpayer will pay less in overall tax in a corporate structure after accounting for the time value of money than the taxpayer
would pay holding an investment in his or her own name. It would simply be too easy of a work around if taxpayers could incorporate a family
office and turn otherwise section 212 expenses into section 162 expenses. Instead, it is far more likely that the dealer-trader-investor analysis does not differ depending on the entity which the taxpayer uses.
B. Private Equity Funds
Private equity funds offer an interesting analogy to family office
structure described in Lender. Because the Lender court spent much of
the opinion comparing the family office to a typical investment fund,46 a
brief detour will enlighten the discussion of the Lender case.
Private equity funds “make investments in portfolio companies,
usually in connection with increasing the leverage of those compa43 Rev. Rul. 78-195, 1978-1 C.B. 39. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.864-3(b), ex. 2 (concluding that a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign holding company is not in a trade or business in the
United States “by reason of the activities carried on in the United States by its chief
executive officer in the supervision of its investment in its operating subsidiary
corporations”).
44 Rev. Rul. 78-195.
45 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
46 See Lender Mgmt., LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2017-246, 114 T.C.M. (CCH)
638 at *2-7 (2017). Although the Lender court mentioned that the family office was providing services similar to that of a hedge fund, it does not seem like the family office was
trading enough to be considered a hedge fund. Because Lender Management seems to
have been buying and holding its interests not for short-term speculation but for longterm potential growth, the analogy to private equity seems more apt.
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nies.”47 These funds usually buy the entire company (i.e., “all or nearly
all of the portfolio company’s outstanding stock”) and usually hold their
investments for over a year.48 Funds are typically structured as Limited
Liability Partnerships where wealthy and tax-exempt investors provide
nearly all of the capital and are the limited partners, private equity fund
managers provide little capital and invest as general partners, and an
affiliated management company provides management services to the
fund in exchange for carried interest.49 Professor Polsky has created a
chart that shows a common private equity legal structure.50

1. Trade or Business
Some commentators have argued that private equity funds are engaged in a trade or business. Steven Rosenthal has argued these funds
are “corporate developers” because they seek to “pursue[ ] and acquire[ ] multiple underperforming companies to turn them around and
sell them for a profit.”51 These funds are not traders because their activity is not “continuous, regular and substantial” (the lifecycle of the private equity fund will likely be over several years, not days).52 Instead,
47 Gregg D. Polsky, A Compendium of Private Equity Tax Games, 146 TAX NOTES
615, 615 (Feb. 2, 2015).
48 Id.
49 Gregg D. Polsky, Tax Aspects of Private Equity Compensation, S. FED. TAX INST.
5 (Power Point Oct. 24, 2018) (on file with author).
50 Id.
51 Steven M. Rosenthal, Private Equity Is a Business: Sun Capital and Beyond, 140
TAX NOTES 1459, 1466 (Sept. 23, 2013).
52 See supra Part II.A.
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Rosenthal argues that private equity funds are like “securities dealers”
who “profit from selling securities from their inventory, intermediating
between buyers and sellers.”53 Like dealers, the private equity fund
buys securities and seeks to sell them for a far greater price years later
“at a profit, which, under the circumstances, differs from a normal investor’s return.”54
Of course, this label is not perfect. First, private equity funds do not
have “customers” or “inventory” in the traditional section 1221 sense.
Although Rosenthal argues that private equity funds should be part of
this definition under the original intent of section 1221,55 such a distinction seems textually difficult.56 On the other hand, for the trade or business test, the “to customers” distinction is not relevant after
Groetzinger.57 Second, unlike most brokers, private equity funds invest
alongside its limited partners. The private equity fund not only receives
compensation for the services it provides, but also receives a return as
an investor. Third, many private equity funds argue that they are not
engaged in a trade or business. Such a categorization is necessary to
prevent adverse effects to foreign and tax-exempt investors.58 Although
this categorization does not affect the trade or business analysis, it is
likely that parties structure their affairs in such a way to weaken the case
that the fund has a trade or business.
But even with this incentive, two courts have concluded that a private equity fund is engaged in a trade or business. First, the Tax Court,
in Dagres v. Commissioner, held that a general partner of a venture capital fund,59 and by connection the member who managed it, was engaged in a trade or business.60 The court explained that the general
partner “did not vend companies or corporate stock to customers as in53

Rosenthal, supra note 51, at 1466.
Id. at 1467.
55 Id. at 1469.
56 Valerie M. Hughes, Flip This Company, but Don’t Leave Its Pensioners Out in the
Cold: Sun Capital as a Call to Action to Change Taxation of Private Equity Funds, 92 N.C.
L. REV. 1322, 1366 (2014) (“However, even if private equity funds engage in a ‘trade or
business,’ they must still hold property ‘primarily for sale to customers’ in order to be
subject to ordinary income rates.”).
57 Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 33 (1987).
58 Gregg D. Polsky, The Untold Story of Sun Capital: Disguised Dividends, 142 TAX
NOTES 556, 556 (Feb. 3, 2014) (“If private equity funds were determined to be in a trade
or business for tax purposes as a result of the monitoring fee/offset structure, foreign
investors might have to recognize effectively connected income, and tax-exempt investors
might have to recognize unrelated business taxable income.”).
59 A venture capital fund is typically described as a subset of private equity, except
that these funds invest in start-up companies and only take a minority stake in those
companies. See Polsky, supra note 47, at 615 n.1.
60 136 T.C. 263, 264 (2011).
54
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ventory but nevertheless, like dealers, did earn compensation (in their
case, fees and a significant profits interest) for the services they provided in managing and directing the investment of the venture capital. . . .”61 The court explained that “[l]ike a stockbroker or a financial
planner, the General Partner L.L.C.s received compensation for services
they rendered to clients.”
The court also dismissed the IRS’s argument that the general partner was not engaged in a trade or business because it had only a one
percent interest in the venture capital fund; instead, the tax court highlighted that the general partner had a carried interest on twenty percent
of the profits that the venture capital fund made.62 The court said that
the 99-percent investors were not looking for a 1-percent coinvestor; they were looking for someone in the business of
managing venture capital funds, who could locate attractive investment targets, investigate those companies, negotiate investment terms, help the companies to thrive, design exit
strategies, liquidate the holdings, and achieve an attractive return for them; and the General Partner L.L.C. conducted that
business.63
A second case is Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England
Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund, in which the First Circuit
held that a private equity fund was engaged in a trade or business, although in the ERISA context where courts look to tax trade or business
cases.64 The appellants were two private equity funds that received investment from limited partners and management services from a general
partner that received a standard two-and-twenty fee structure (as discussed in the next sub-section) as compensation for the services it provided. The private equity funds bought a trucking company and, after
the trucking company declared for bankruptcy, argued that they should
not be liable for the company’s pension obligations. Because only a parent company engaged in a trade or business can be liable for a subsidiary’s pension obligations under 29 U.S.C. § 1301, the private equity
funds argued that they were not liable because “they cannot be ‘trades
or businesses’” under Supreme Court tax cases like Higgins.65
The First Circuit rejected the private equity funds argument and
instead adopted an “investment plus” approach advocated for by the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.66 The court noted that the stan61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 284.
Id. at 284–85.
Id. at 285–86.
724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013).
Id. at 144.
Id. at 141.
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dard was “a very fact-specific approach” in which no factor “is dispositive in and of itself.”67 The court went out of its way to say that, even
though “trade or business” may be applied differently in section 162
than it is used in ERISA, the investment plus test dovetails with other
tax trade or business cases like Groetzinger. Although the court did not
precisely label what constituted a “plus” activity and what did not, it was
sufficiently convinced that one of the private equity funds satisfied the
plus standard.68 Several factors were important to this factual finding:
• In its partnership agreements and private placement memorandums, the funds stated that “a ‘principal purpose’ of the
partnership is the ‘manag[ement] and supervisi[on]’ of its
investments.”
• The General Partner had “exclusive and wide-ranging management authority” about “hiring, terminating, and compensating agents and employees of the [funds].”
• The private placement memorandums noted that the General Partners “work to reduce costs, [and] improve margins” and monitor investments of the Fund.
• The overall goal of the investment fund was to “sell[ ] the
portfolio company for a profit” in less than five years.69
Some have argued that the First Circuit’s analysis was lacking. Rosenthal argued that some of the points that the court emphasized “were
slender reeds to distinguish a trade or business and, in [his] view, confused the Whipple inquiry.”70 Instead, he argued that the court should
have adopted a new test that falls in line with his corporate developer
model.71 Others have argued that “[b]y failing to define the ‘plus’ in its
‘investment plus’ standard, the First Circuit also avoided making a precedent that other courts could easily apply.”72 Some have questioned
whether labeling a private equity fund a trade or business is good from a
policy perspective,73 but the label is likely here to stay for some funds.
67

Id.
Id. at 133.
69 Id. at 142.
70 Rosenthal, supra note 51, at 1466.
71 Id. at 1466-67.
72 Hughes, supra note 56, at 1358.
73 See Sarah Sutton Osborne, Comment, Carried Away: Sun Capital, Politics, and
the Potential for A New Spin on “Trade or Business” in Private Equity, 45 CUMB. L. REV.
595, 637 (2015) (“If tax analysts are able to analogize private equity funds with real estate
developers, do we allow the analogy to dictate regulatory change despite the significant
effect on the economy? While political forces may successfully roust carried interests
from their current capital gains treatment, private contracting and market forces will
likely redistribute funds’ returns at the expense of the government and economy. Accordingly, regulators must consider what policy objective would such a shift in carried interest
68
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In the end, Sun Capital is more remarkable because it created a
new way to look at the traditional trade or business test.74 As Part IV
explores, applying this new type of test to the family office context may
offer a more doctrinally consistent way to look at the trade or business
characterization than the traditional trader-dealer-investor test.
2. Compensation
Private equity funds are often compensated in two ways, by a management fee and carried interest.75 Top investment funds often charge
an investment fee of two percent of assets under management.76 Funds
get this fee every year to ensure that they can keep the lights running in
the investment firm. But private equity funds often receive the bulk of
their compensation from carried interest, through which a fund will receive some of the profits that an investment vehicle makes (often twenty
percent) after the vehicle makes more than a hurdle rate (often eight
percent).77
There may be a time-delay on when the investment funds make the
profit which could artificially inflate the amount of carried interest that
the investment fund earns. To protect the investor, funds often have
taxation ultimately achieve?”); cf. Victor Fleischer, Sun Capital Court Ruling Threatens
Structure of Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 1, 2013, 12:28 PM), https://deal
book.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/sun-capital-court-ruling-threatens-private-equity-structure/
(“No one disputes that the general partner (or its affiliated management company) often
gets highly involved with the fund’s portfolio companies. In Sun Capital, for example, the
management company weighed in on the portfolio company’s personnel decisions, capital
spending and possible acquisitions. The critical question is whether the general partner’s
activities can be attributed ‘downward’ to the fund – that is, from the partner to the
partnership.”).
74 Cf. Mark J. DeLuca, It’s Not Always Sunny in Private Equity: Analysis and Impact of the First Circuit’s Sun Capital Decision, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1441, 1469 (2014) (quoting a Treasury official who said that the decision gave the agency the “opportunity to
reassess what ‘trade or business’ means” for tax purposes).
75 A third way in which private equity funds receive compensation are via fees paid
from portfolio companies to the general partner. But these so-called “monitoring fees”
are not relevant to the family office structure. For a discussion of monitoring fees more
generally, see Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Monitoring Fees as Dividends: Collateral
Impact, 143 TAX NOTES 1053 (June 2, 2014).
76 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private
Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008); Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It
Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071, 1075 (2008).
77 Fleischer, supra note 76, at 22. “The profits interest is what gives fund managers
upside potential: If the fund does well, the managers share in the treasure. If the fund
does badly, however, the manager can walk away. Any proceeds remaining at liquidation
would be distributed to the original investors, who hold the capital interests in the partnership.” Id. at 3.
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three protections in place.78 First, many funds take an “investor by investor” approach when determining the amount of carried interest.79
Because investors may enter the fund at different points, the fund may
be in the carry for one investor and not the other, depending on what
the value of the fund was when the investor interested. This investor
specific approach ensures that the firm does not earn carry that it does
not otherwise deserve.
Second, investment funds typically have a “high-water mark” provision in which a fund will aggregate the amount of total losses that an
investor has received over the life of a fund.80 The high-water mark ensures that a fund will not receive carry in a later year if the fund maintained massive losses in an earlier year. For example, if fund A sustained
a loss in year 1 of $10, loss in year 2 of $20, and a gain in year 3 of $30,
the fund would have the same net asset value at the end of year three it
had when it started. Without a high-water mark provision, the fund
could earn a carry of $6 in year 3 (20% of the $30 gain). Funds that have
such a provision will not get the carry in year 3 and will only get a carry
after the fund has made money.
Third, some funds have a “clawback” provision in which if a private
equity fund earns carry in an earlier year and then loses money in a
subsequent year, then the fund will refund the carry.81 A common provision is that a fund that earns a carry in one year but loses money within
a period (e.g., three years after the grant of profits interest) will repay
the earned carry. Here, the general partner would disgorge their profits
interest at liquidation if the investor did not obtain the liquidation value
of their account.82
The take-away for this subsection is that private equity compensation is not something set in stone, but depends on the economic deal
78 Still, some private equity funds engage in tricks to maximize the fund return,
possibly to the detriment of investors. See id. at 22 (noting that private equity funds
charge a fund-favorable preferable return whereby the “profits are then allocated disproportionately to the GP” after the fund crosses the hurdle rate “until the GP’s compensation catches up to the point where it would have been had the GP received twenty
percent of the profits from the first dollar.”). On the other hand, some private equity
funds arguably help investors who would have otherwise been limited by the section
67(a) limit on section 212 expenses. See Gregg D. Polsky, A Compendium of Private
Equity Tax Games, 146 TAX NOTES 615 (Feb. 2, 2015) (discussing strategies of the private
equity fund, including monitoring fees and monitoring fee deductions, that arguably help
limited partners).
79 See Andrew W. Needham, U.S. Income, 736 TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS (BNA), at
III.C.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
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that limited partners strike with the funds’ general partner.83 The rate
that the fund charges and the protections that limited partners demand
reflect the bargaining power and the risk appetite of funds and investors.84 The compensation hinges on the investor and fund negotiating
over each term. Without this negotiation, it is likely that a carried interest fee may not resemble a typical fee of a private equity fund. In the
family office context, a future court may be more skeptical that a deal
was at arm’s length if the parties did not negotiate over the terms of the
carry.
3. Disguised Fee for Services
But it is important to step back to highlight why the profits interest
has become so ubiquitous in the private equity: the preferential capital
gain tax rate. Much has been said about the policy arguments for and
against this preferential tax rate and this paper will not reiterate that
discussion.85 This preferential capital gain rate is also essential for the
family office structure. If the family office paid tax at an ordinary rate
for the income on the services that it performs for the investment partnerships, it is far more likely that family offices would not be as popular
as they are now. Put differently, few investors would pay tax on gains at
an ordinary tax rate and deduct investment expenses if they could pay
tax on gains at a preferential rate.
Private equity funds pay tax at a preferential rate when they receive
compensation by a profits interest and hold that profits interest for at
least three years.86 A taxpayer receiving a profits interest would not be
taxed when the taxpayer receives the interest in the partnership, but
would be taxed when the taxpayer disposes of that interest. However,
that is not the only way to view the transaction. The IRS may instead
argue that the profits interest is in substance a fee for services that the
partner provides the partnership. Section 707(a)(2)(A) allows the IRS
to recharacterize a profits interest into a disguised fee for services that
would be immediately taxable at ordinary rates when the partner receives that interest.
In 2015, the government released proposed regulations under section 707(a)(2)(A) which maintained that the IRS would apply a factsand-circumstances test to evaluate whether a profits interest would be
respected.87 Although these regulations have not been finalized, they
offer the most authoritative view as to when a profits interest will be
83
84
85
86
87

See id. at III.A.
Id.
See Fleischer, supra note 76, at 3-6.
See I.R.C. § 1061.
80 Fed. Reg. 43652, 43653 (July 23, 2015).
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recharacterized as compensation for services. The regulations listed six
factors for the test, with the most important factor being whether the
arrangement has “significant entrepreneurial risk,”88 which the taxpayer
must show with clear and convincing evidence.89 A profits interest that
lacks significant entrepreneurial risk will likely not be respected as a
profits interest and will instead be recharacterized as a payment for services. The regulations list five arrangements that lack significant entrepreneurial risk:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

(v)

Capped allocations of partnership income if the cap is reasonably expected to apply in most years;
An allocation for one or more years under which the service provider’s share of income is reasonably certain;
An allocation of gross income;
An allocation (under a formula or otherwise) that is
predominantly fixed in amount, is reasonably determinable under all the facts and circumstances, or is designed to
assure that sufficient net profits are highly likely to be
available to make the allocation to the service provider
(e.g. if the partnership agreement provides for an allocation of net profits from specific transactions or accounting
periods and this allocation does not depend on the longterm future success of the enterprise); or
An arrangement in which a service provider waives its
right to receive payment for the future performance of
services in a manner that is non-binding or fails to timely
notify the partnership and its partners of the waiver and
its terms.90

Example five to the proposed regulations expounds on this point in
the context of private equity funds. The example provides that
A is a general partner in newly-formed partnership ABC, an
investment fund. A is responsible for providing management
services to ABC, but has delegated that management function
to M, a company controlled by A. Funds that are comparable
to ABC commonly require the general partner to contribute
capital in an amount equal to one percent of the capital contributed by the limited partners, provide the general partner
with an interest in 20 percent of future partnership net income
and gains as measured over the life of the fund, and pay the
88
89
90

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-2(c)(1), 80 Fed. Reg. at 43658.
Id.
Id. at 43658-59.
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fund manager annually an amount equal to two percent of capital committed by the partners.91
The example states that A’s interest in the net income of the partnership
has significant entrepreneurial risk because A has a clawback obligation
for its profits interest, it is neither “highly likely to be available nor reasonably determinable” that A would receive an allocation of net income, and the present value of the interest equals the amount of capital
that A contributed to the partnership.92 Because there is a significant
risk that A’s profits interest would not be worth anything if ABC did
not make any money, A’s profit interest will be respected and will not
be a disguised fee for services.
One hurdle to this strategy is that private equity funds try to minimize the risk that they will not be compensated. Funds can make the
profits interest as a percentage of revenue, or virtually guarantee that
the partner may be allocated a profits interest by way of a priority allocation, whereby a partner is allocated a percentage of the gain or revenue equal to a certain amount before any other partner receives an
income allocation.93 But there is a risk that implementing these strategies may eliminate significant entrepreneurial risk that the profits interest will not come to fruition. Private equity lawyers seek to create an
allocation that minimizes risk and ensures that the gain will be taxed at
preferential capital gains rates.
In summary, the disguised fees for services proposed regulations
show that the term “profits interest” does not have a uniform meaning.
Such an interest may not have significant entrepreneurial risk because
the fund has a priority allocation or because the profits interest is based
on a percentage of gross income. And because family offices need to be
profitable in order to satisfy the trade or business characterization, they
may have the same incentive as the private equity fund to maximize the
likelihood of being allocated a portion of the gain of the partnership. As
the Lender case shows, family offices may seek to implement profits interest as a percentage of trading costs and without clawback provisions.
Before discussing how the Lender family used the profits interest, a
brief detour is necessary to explain why and how the family created the
family office structure.

91
92
93

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-2(d), 80 Fed. Reg. at 43660.
Id.
Id. at 43659 (Example 3).
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III. THE LENDER CASE
A. Lender Family
The Lender family story begins with the patriarch of the family—
Harry—who, in 1929, opened a bagel shop in New Haven, Connecticut.94 The shop was very popular on the weekend, but was dead during
the week.95 As a result, Harry needed to bake the bagels close to the
weekend because bagels staled quickly. This “uneven timed demand”
create a huge amount of inefficiency and lead to poor employee morale
for those people who did not want to spend their entire weekend at a
bagel shop. To solve this demand, Harry froze bagels, allowing workers
to make the bagels earlier in the week without getting stale before the
weekend rush.96
Harry’s sons, Marvin and Murry, used this revolutionary idea to get
bagels onto American supermarket shelves.97 Without Marvin and
Murry, bagels would not be as widely known and loved as they are today.98 Although the bagels’ taste may have been lacking, some have argued that “Lender’s innovated by finding a way to compromise on
quality and reap huge gains in other spheres.”99 By offering an inferior
product that could be frozen, Lender’s marketed a new product to millions of Americans who would otherwise not have discovered the product.100 Marvin and Murry sold Lender’s to Kraft in 1984 for a reported
$90 million dollars,101 worth roughly $220 million in 2019 dollars.102 The
Lenders used their newfound wealth to diversify and make other nonbagel-related investments.
1. Need for a Family Office Structure
In 1987, soon after selling Lender’s, the family set up Lender Management LLC (Lender Management), which was the entity under dis94 See Matthew Yglesias, Lender’s Bagels and the Power of Mediocrity, SLATE (Mar.
27, 2012, 3:23 PM), https://slate.com/business/2012/03/murray-lender-and-frozen-bagelsthe-man-who-made-america-better-by-making-bagels-worse.html.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See, e.g., Emily S, 10 Reasons Why Bagels Are The Ultimate Breakfast Food,
THETHINGS (June 14, 2016), https://www.thethings.com/10-reasons-why-bagels-are-theultimate-breakfast-food/.
99 Yglesias, supra note 94.
100 Id.
101 Lucia Greene, Murray Lender Cried ‘long Live the Bagel!’ and Now He’s into the
Big Dough, PEOPLE (Apr. 28, 1986, 12:00 PM), https://people.com/archive/murray-lendercried-long-live-the-bagel-and-now-hes-into-the-big-dough-vol-25-no-17/.
102 US INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ (last visited
Mar. 22, 2020).
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pute in the case. Lender Management facilitated investment and helped
to grow the family fortune.103 Lender Management was a partnership
for tax purposes.104 Besides the other benefits of pooling investments
such as lower fees and greater access to private investment vehicles,105
the Lender family implemented this structure in part because there were
a lot of Lenders.106 At the tax year in issue, four generations of Lenders
participated in the investment structure: the G1 generation (Harry’s
wife); G2 generation (including Marvin, Murry, and their spouses); the
G3 generation (including Keith and Carl); and the G4 generation (ten of
Harry’s great-grandchildren). And the members in the G3 generation,
except Keith, had careers independent of Lender Management.107

Harry

Marvin

Keith

Sondra

Murry

Heidi

Four Minor Grandchildren

Carl

Jay

Haris

Six Minor Grandchildren

Although the family pooled their money together, a lot of things
inhibited the Lender Management team from acting as one cohesive
voice. First, the Tax Court recognized there were “numerous divorces
among Lender family members,” including a divorce from Murry and
his ex-wife which depleted the Murry side of the Family Office.108 Second, one member of the G2 generation—Harry’s daughter—decided
not to invest within the family structure.109 Third, some of the family
103 Lender Mgmt., LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2017-246, 114 T.C.M. (CCH) 638 at
*3 (2017).
104 Id. at *1.
105 See Aghdami & Harris, supra note 5 (“A family office can create economies of
scale for a family, reduce the cost of services, open investment opportunities, help guarantee privacy, and allow for greater family control over service providers.”).
106 Lender, 114 T.C.M. (CCH) at *2-4.
107 Id. at *1.
108 Id. at *2.
109 Id. at *1.

200

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:179

members “were in such conflict with others that they refused to attend
the same business meetings.”110 Fourth, the Lenders lived in many different states and countries.111
In 2005, Lender Management tried to assuage the concerns of some
family members and “engaged a hedge fund specialist to help it restructure its affairs and its management portfolio using a hedge fund, or ‘fund
of funds,’ manager model.”112 After the restructuring, “Lender Management divided its managed portfolio into the three investment LLCs,”
which were split between asset classes: Murry & Marvin Lender Investments LLC (M&M), which invested in private equity and other alternative asset classes; Lenco Investments LLC (Lenco), which invested in
hedge funds; and Lotis Equity LLC (Lotis), which invested in publiccompany stocks.113 Each investment LLC was in turn owned by Lender
Management and other entities (trusts and other family investment partnerships) that Lender family members controlled.114 Lender Management was owned by two trusts.115 To illustrate the ownership diagram,
below is a chart that shows the direct ownership of M&M in 2012:

2. Activities of the Family Office
Lender Management had two functions. First, it provided investment advice to members of the Lender family. The Lender family members had no obligation to keep money within the family office structure.
Instead, the office said that its “investment choices and related activities
were driven by the needs of clients.”116 And because the Lender family
“did not act collectively or with a single mindset,” the family office “provided investment advisory services and managed investments for each of
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at *12.
at *1.
at *3.

at *2.
at *12.
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its clients individually, regardless of the clients’ relationship to each
other or to the managing member of Lender Management.”117 If any
investor grew dissatisfied with the family office or otherwise needed
capital for other uses, that investor could withdraw their money from
the investment LLCs at any point, subject to liquidity and approval from
the family office.118
Second, Lender Management provided management services to the
investment LLCs—M&M, Lenco, and Lotis. Lender Management had
“the exclusive rights to direct the business and affairs of” each investment LLC.119 The entity also “managed the downstream entities in
which M&M held a controlling interest,” which constituted about 1215% of M&M’s portfolio.120
Keith Lender, part of the G3 generation, was the Chief Investment
Officer for Lender Management. He worked about fifty hours a week,
communicated with his family members (whom he called “clients”)
about their investments, reviewed over “150 private equity and hedge
fund proposals per year on behalf of the investment LLCs,” and met
with various investors who sought capital from the Investment LLCs.121
He also tried to meet once a year with each client about their investment goals in the family office structure.122 Notably, however, Lender
Management was not a trader because Keith did make individual investment decisions about what asset to buy or sell, nor was it a dealer that
made profit by reselling investments above-cost to clients.123
Including Keith, Lender Management employed five individuals
and had a total payroll of over $390,000 in 2012.124 The employees’
“main objective was to earn the highest possible return on assets under
management.”125 The employees managed the cash flow of the operation—including for capital calls from private equity firms—and provided financial information to the family members. 126 Lender
Management outsourced many of its accounting and investment advisory responsibilities to Pathstone Family Office, LLC.127 Although
Lender Management had ultimate authority, Pathstone prepared quar117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id.
Id. at *4, *12.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
See id. at *4-5.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. *6-7.
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terly financial reports for the LLCs and provided due diligence for prospective investments.128
3. Carried Interest
Part of the 2005 shift to the “funds-of-fund” model was a shift in
how Lender Management was compensated. In exchange for the value it
gave its members, Lender Management received “Class A interests”
from the investment LLCs, similar to the carried interest described in
the previous section.129 But Lender received no payments from the family members whose money it advised; instead, its sole method of compensation, and the only way it received money to pay its operating
expenses, was through the carried interest and management fees that it
received. Lender Management argued this compensation meant that the
office shifted from a cost-based to a “profit-based” office model.130
But the compensation of Lender Management was not like the investment funds it modeled its business after. From M&M and Lenco,
Lender Management received carried interest “of 2.5% of net asset
value, plus 25% of the increase in net asset value, annually.”131 From
Lotis, it received carried interest of “2% of net asset value annually,
plus 5% of net trading profits.”132 These values vastly exceed the typical
“2 and 20” fee charged by investment funds. Part IV explores whether
this excessive fee compensation was really an investor return and
whether the fee was in substance a disguised fee for services because the
arrangement lacked significant entrepreneurial risk.
B. The Tax Court Decision
Judge Kerrigan concisely summed up the issue in Lender: “The sole
issue for consideration is whether Lender Management carried on a
trade or business within the meaning of section 162. . . .”133 After discussing the factual, procedural, and preliminary evidentiary issues, the
Tax Court began its opinion by discussing the differences in deducting
investment expenses under section 162, whereby a taxpayer engaged in
a trade or business can take above-the-line deductions, and section 212,
where a taxpayer is only engaged in making income and can only take
below-the-line deductions that may be limited.134 For the tax years at
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
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Id.
Id.

at *4.
at *3.
at *4.
at *1.
at *8.

Spring/Summer 2020]

FAMILY OFFICE EXPENSES

203

issue, Lender Management claimed section 162 expenses of over $1 million related to the family office’s management expenses.135
The Tax Court noted “[t]he Code does not define the term ‘trade or
business.’”136 Instead, it used the facts-and-circumstances Groetzinger
test: the taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business when it acted “with
continuity and regularity” and when “the taxpayer’s primary purpose
for engaging in the activity” was a desire “for income or profit.”137 The
Tax Court also cited Whipple and Higgins for the proposition that managing your own investments is not enough to establish a trade or
business.138
But the court did not use the typical dealer-trader-investor label to
distinguish whether a taxpayer has a trade or business. Instead, it said
that a trade or business may been established if the taxpayer receives
“compensation other than the normal investor’s return,” including “services provided to others.”139 The court explained that “[t]he trade-orbusiness designation may apply even though the taxpayer invests his or
her own funds alongside those that are managed for others, provided
the facts otherwise support the conclusion that the taxpayer is actively
engaged in providing services to others and is not just a passive
investor.”140
In the court’s view, “Lender Management provided investment advisory and financial planning services” to family members that “were
comparable to the services that hedge fund managers provide.”141 The
court mentioned that the taxpayer managed cash flow for the family’s
investments, provided bookkeeping functions, and selected investment
managers to manage the family wealth.142 And by providing these services, the family office “was entitled to profits interests as compensation
for its services to its clients to the extent that it successfully managed its
clients’ investments.”143
Based on the services the taxpayer provided and the profits interest
it received, the court concluded that “Lender Management’s activities
were providing investment management services, which it primarily provided to and for the benefit of clients other than itself,” similar to the
Venture Capitalist in Dagres who invested money on behalf of his cli135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
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at *7.
at *8.
(citing Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987)).
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ents.144 Still, the Tax Court explained that the transactions between the
Lender family members were “subject to heightened scrutiny” because
of the interwoven family nature of the business.145 But even under this
more stringent test, the court found that the taxpayer had established a
“bona fide business relationship” with the family members for three
reasons.146
First, the family members were not required, nor was there any obligation or expectation, to keep their money in the investment LLCs.
Lender Management needed to approve any “complete withdrawal”147
from the investment funds, but the Tax Court was satisfied that the taxpayer would have acted reasonably.148 Second, the family members
“were geographically dispersed, many did not know each other, and
some were in such conflict with others that they refused to attend the
same business meetings.”149 Lender Management needed to tailor its
investment expertise to each family member and could not provide
blanket advice to everyone. Third, the court explained that many family
members generated employment income besides whatever investment
income they received from the investment LLCs.150 The Tax Court’s
reasoning on this point was rather circular, as it explained that Keith
generated employment income from Lender Management, which only
received its income because it invested the family fortune.151
IV. IMPLICATIONS

OF

LENDER

The Lender decision was undoubtably a positive decision for family
offices looking to deduct investment expenses. Still, the decision was not
as positive as one may expect. This section expands on two points why
taxpayers may not benefit from the Lender decision as much as they
would have hoped: the court’s rationale was not persuasive on some
points and the holding is narrow relative to the universe of family
offices.
144

Id. at *11.
Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at *12.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. The Tax Court also stressed there were “no applicable attribution rules that
would require” Lender Management to be “owning all of the interests in the investment
LLCs.” Id. at *13. Lender Management was owned by trusts operated to benefit Keith
and Murry, both of whom did not own most of the interests in the investment LLCs.
145
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A. Critique of Lender
1. Profits Interest
One of the key facts in Lender was that the family office “was entitled to profits interests as compensation for its services to its clients to
the extent that it successfully managed its clients’ investments.”152 In
other words, the court took the profits interest as a sign that the family
office had a bona fide business relationship with the investment partnerships. But as Part II discussed, there are many ways in which a fund may
structure a profits interest, including in ways that lack significant entrepreneurial risk. If a partner receives a profits interest that is virtually
certain to create a positive profits allocation from the partnership, that
partner in substance received a disguised fee for services that, if
recharacterized, would be taxable at an ordinary tax rate instead of at a
preferential capital gains tax rate. In contrast, if a partner receives a
profits interest subject to a clawback provision (i.e., the partner only
gets a profits allocation if the partnership makes money), the profits interest will be respected as such.
Although not discussed in Lender, it is likely that the management
fee that Lender Management charged the investment partnerships did
not have significant entrepreneurial risk. To recap, here is a chart of the
fees that the family office charged relative to the fee that private equity
funds normally charge:
Compensation
Type

Typical PE
Fund

M&M

Lenco

Lotis

Management
Fee

2% of net
asset value
(“NAV”)

2.5% of NAV

2.5% of NAV

2% of NAV

Carried Interest

20% profits

25% of
increase in
NAV

25% of
increase in
NAV

5% of net
trading profits

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Limitations on Only get carry
Carry
after 8% hurdle
Clawback

If subsequent
loss within 3
years

We do not know enough about the operations of Lender Management
to know for sure, but one can speculate that a fee based on changes in
“net asset value” or as a percentage of trading profits likely does not
152

Id. at *10.
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have significant entrepreneurial risk under the test described in disguised fee proposed regulations.153 These allocations seem to be ones
that are “reasonably determinable” or “designed to assure that sufficient net profits are highly likely to be available” to make the allocation.154 Although not raised by the IRS, this paper speculates that these
profits interests should have been considered disguised fees for services.
If the Tax Court did make that determination, Lender Management
would have needed to pay ordinary income tax on the profits interest
that it received for providing services to the investment partnerships.
The harder question is how a profits interest that lacks significant
entrepreneurial risk changes the trade or business analysis. The Lender
court did not address this point and it is hard to speculate how a future
court will view this argument. Because the significant entrepreneurial
risk test operates for a different purpose, a court may find that the analysis does not change the trade or business test because a profits interest
may still show that the family office acted like a normal investment adviser or private equity fund. And because some private equity funds
draft carried interest provisions that have priority allocations and do not
impose a clawback obligation on the general partner, there is an argument that a profits interest that lacks significant entrepreneurial risk
may show that the arrangement had a business relationship.
But a more straight-forward approach is that a profits interest that
lacks significant entrepreneurial risk should not be a positive factor in
determining whether the family office is a trade or business. For example, the Lender Management profits interest depends on “net asset
value,” which seems to be virtually certain to create some profit allocation. Because the family office could receive an allocation even if the
investment partnership lost money over the life of the fund or did not
achieve a sufficient return over a hurdle rate, the family office could
theoretically receive a profits interest that approximated an investor’s
normal rate of return. The Whipple Court acknowledged that an investor likely does not have a trade or business when its “only return is that
of an investor.”155 Because a family office receives a return similar to
that of an investor when it receives a profits interest that lacks significant entrepreneurial risk, this type of profits interest should not be a
positive factor that a family office has a trade or business.
Future courts should carefully consider whether the profits interest
has significant entrepreneurial risk. Courts must analyze whether the
profits interest seems like one in which an investor may receive a return
that approximates the return that an investor should get. Because there
153
154
155

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-2(c), 80 Fed. Reg. 43652, 43658 (July 23, 2015).
Id. § 1.707-2(c)(1)(iv), 80 Fed. Reg. at 43658.
Whipple v. Comm’r, 373 U.S. 193, 202 (1963).
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are many ways to structure profits interests, courts need to be more
stringent and cannot conclude that there is such thing as a typical profits
interest. And lawyers setting up future Lender type structures need to
demonstrate why any given profits interest works and why there is significant entrepreneurial risk that the profits interest may not come to
fruition.
2.

Trade or Business Test

A second critique of Lender is that the case used an unconventional
way to look at the trade or business question. This doctrinal analysis of
Lender is important because the case is a memorandum opinion and
therefore has no precedential value. Another Tax Court Judge may consider Lender persuasive, but there is no guarantee that another judge
will adopt the rationale of the case.
As Part II explained, the traditional way to look at whether someone buying and selling securities is engaged in a trade or business is
through the trader-investor-dealer lens. Using a strict doctrinal test is
probably bad for a family office taxpayer. These taxpayers do not trade
enough to be considered a “trader” nor do they vend securities to other
customers like a brokerage house and therefore likely are not considered a “dealer.” The default under this standard would be that a family
office would be an investor unable to take a section 162 deduction for
investment expenses. Under this traditional analysis, it is hard to see
how any family office or private equity fund would ever be engaged in a
trade or business. Such analysis follows from the cases described in Part
II but may produce an unduly harsh result for family offices or funds
that seem to have a legitimate trade or business.
Many courts have not followed this traditional approach, and the
result in Lender is unsurprising given the progression of the trade or
business doctrine. As one commentator has noted: “Pity the poor Treasury Department and the long-suffering IRS. They won a big victory in
the United States Supreme Court in the Higgins case back in 1941 and
have spent the better part of the last 70 years defending their victory
from Congress and the courts.”156 Investors have been successfully chipping away at the trade or business distinction and the core holding in
Higgins ever since. But Higgins is still good law and the courts that chip
away too much are likely contravening this precedent.
That said, Part II showed how the trade or business test can apply
to private equity and other investment funds in a way that might be
consistent with Higgins and other Supreme Court cases. The Tax Court
156 Stafford Smiley & Michael Lloyd, Sun Capital Partners and the Private Equity
Industry, 41 J. CORP. TAX’N 35, 35 (Jan./Feb. 2014).
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in Dagres and the First Circuit in Sun Capital used innovative approaches to argue that a private equity fund is engaged in a trade or
business. Given that the Supreme Court decided Groetzinger, its last
trade or business case, long before the meteoric rise in private equity,
such a malleable approach is necessary. Many private equity and investment funds have an important effect on the economy and should be a
trade or business for deducting investment expenses. While a fund-offunds may not have enough activity to constitute a trade or business,157
it is very likely that private equity funds like the ones in Dagres and Sun
Capital have enough activity to be considered a trade or business.
But even if private equity funds are engaged in a trade or business,
should family offices also have a trade or business label? It is likely that
many family offices—including the $25 billion family office run by
George Soros and the multi-billion office run by the Pritzker
Group158—are engaged in a trade or business. These funds manage billions of dollars and compete directly with the top private equity and
hedge funds for talent and acquisitions. Drawing the line between what
is a trade or businesses is difficult, especially considering infamous
words that the trade or business inquiry does not depend on “how large
the estate or how continuous or extended the work required may be.”159
Smaller family offices like Lender Management fall somewhere in
between a funds-of-funds and a private equity fund. On one hand, a
family office typically does more than a fund-of-funds because they give
personalized advice to the group of individuals that invest in the funds.
On the other hand, a family office typically takes a minority ownership
in companies and does not have the same business model as a typical
private equity fund.
The Tax Court noted that Lender Management provided “services
similar to those of a hedge fund manager,”160 and “did substantially
more than keeping records and collecting interest and dividends.”161 Yet
the family office only selected the fund that would deploy the family’s
capital. Nor did the family office conduct due diligence about the funds
in which it invested; instead, it outsourced that function to outside accountants.162 Unlike the general partner in Dagres, the Lender family
office did not “investigate” companies, “negotiate investment terms,
help the companies to thrive, design exit strategies, [or] liquidate the
157

Rev. Rul. 2008-39, 2008-31 I.R.B. 252.
See How the 0.001% invest, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 2018.
159 Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941).
160 Lender Mgmt., LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2017-246, 114 T.C.M. (CCH) 638 at
*13 (2017).
161 Id. at *12.
162 Id. at *6.
158

Spring/Summer 2020]

FAMILY OFFICE EXPENSES

209

holdings.”163 Nor was the family office like the private equity fund in
Sun Capital that adopted an active and substantial role in the “management and supervision” of the portfolio companies that it acquired.164
Put differently, it is unclear given the court’s reasoning why Lender
Management was in a trade or business.
This paper advocates for courts to take the approach of Judge
Lauber in Hellmann, which is discussed in the next section, by asking
narrow questions that get to the essence of the family office’s activities.
This test aligns with the “investment plus” standard in Sun Capital because it seeks to ask whether the family office has done enough to satisfy some sort of “plus” standard that sets it apart from an investor like
the taxpayer in Higgins. Asking questions about how the family office
operates is more helpful than asking how that family office relates to a
traditional investment fund because, as Part II showed, there is so much
variety in the private equity and hedge fund world.
B. The Narrow Lender Holding
The take-away from the Lender case is that a family office can be a
trade or business, not that every family office is a trade or business. And
even with the beneficial income tax deduction, some family offices may
choose not to create a Lender structure because creating that type of
structure would lead to other adverse tax consequences. This paper lists
four reasons why the costs to implementing this structure may exceed
the benefits.
1. Many Family Offices Do Not Satisfy the Lender Standard
First, many family office structures cannot strictly fall into the
Lender guidelines and may be unable to claim the section 162 deduction. An order by Tax Court Judge Lauber in Hellmann v. Commissioner illustrates this point.165 Both parties in the case moved for
summary judgment on the issue of whether the family office was engaged in a trade or business.166 The family office was a limited liability
company owned equally by four individuals of the same family.167 The
family created six investment partnerships where the family office
163

Dagres v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 263, 285–86 (2011).
Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 142 (2013).
165 Order at 4, Hellmann v. Comm’r (T.C. Oct. 1, 2018) (No. 8486-17), https://www.us
taxcourt.gov/InternetOrders/DocumentViewer.aspx?IndexSearchableOrdersID=
271882&Todays=Y (rejecting cross-motions for summary judgment).
166 Id. at 1.
167 Id.
164
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owned 1% of the partnership and trusts created for the benefit of the
four individuals owned the rest of the 99%.168
Judge Lauber noted that although the cases consolidated before
him “appear to resemble Lender Management in some respects,” there
were key distinctions: all four individuals were from the same family and
were on good terms.169 Judge Lauber declined to state that the family
office was engaged in a trade or business by virtue of the profits interest
that the family office received.170 Unlike the family office in Lender that
was controlled by one family member who had a 99% profit interest, the
family office in Hellmann was controlled by all four members who, if
they also proportionally owned the investment partnerships, “would
simply replace investment income that each person would otherwise
have derived from the investment portfolios.”171 Or, put in Whipple terminology, the return of the family office would simply be that of a typical investor.
In that Order, Judge Lauber said that he planned to consider at
least five non-exclusive factors for determining this question:
1. the manner in which the family office was compensated for
its services;
2. the nature and extent of the services provided by the family office employees;
3. the relative amounts of expertise possessed and time devoted by family office employees versus outside investment managers and consultants;
4. the individualization of investment strategies for different
family members with differing investment preferences and
needs; and
5. the proportionality (or lack thereof) between the share of
profits inuring to each family member in his or her capacity
as an owner of the family office and the share of profits
inuring to that same individual in his or her capacity as an
investor in the managed funds.172
Although Judge Lauber ordered the parties to brief why the family
office was or was not engaged in a trade or business, he eventually denied the both sets of motions and the parties settled outside court. We
do not know whether a judge would find that the family office in Hellmann is a trade or business, but this paper speculates that the taxpayer
168
169
170
171
172

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 3-4.
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agreed to the settlement because it did not think that its chances were
good.
The corollary of Hellmann and Lender is that family offices can satisfy the trade or business test only if the family office advises a multigenerational, contentious, and geographically dispersed family and receives compensation in a way that differs from a normal investor’s return. Perhaps some family offices that do not follow this structure may
still qualify as a trade or business, but given the extremely factual nature
of this inquiry, there is no guarantee as to how a court will view a new
fact pattern. And given this paper has argued that the Lender rationale
is not persuasive, it is unclear how a future court will interpret this type
of fact pattern.
The broader point is that this Hellmann order should give lawyers
and family office advisers pause. Although clients may have a strong
urge to conclude that their family office is a trade or business based on
the Lender decision, advisers must temper their client’s expectations.
This is an unsettled area of the law that the IRS will be eager to litigate.
2.

Some Family Offices Will Need to Register with the SEC

Second, many family office structures will be unable to implement a
Lender structure without registering with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). An important consideration to this structure, not
mentioned in the Tax Court’s opinion, is that the family office did not
need to register as an investment advisor with the SEC. Generally, people or entities that give investment advice are labeled as an “investment
adviser,” which means that they need to register with the SEC and comply with the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.173
SEC rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1 provides an exception to registration for
certain family offices, which it defines as an entity that “has no other
clients other than family clients . . . is wholly owned by family clients and
is exclusively controlled . . . by one or more family members . . . [and]
does not hold itself out to the public as an investment adviser.”174 Family clients generally include any family member (including entities controlled by trusts for the benefit of that family member) or a current or
former “key employee,” which is defined as someone who “in connection with his or her regular functions or duties, participates in the investment activities of the family office or affiliated family office . . . .”175
If the family office meets this definition, the office need not register
as an adviser with the SEC.176 The exemption from the Advisers Act is
173
174
175
176

15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 through 80b-21 (2012).
17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(b) (2019).
Id. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(8).
Id. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(a).
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essential: without it, it is likely that the costs of complying with the adviser rules would be too burdensome for a small entity like Lender Management.177 The SEC adopted this rule in part because family offices do
not act like traditional investment advisers.178 It explained that
[t]he core policy judgment . . . is the lack of need for application of the Advisers Act to the typical single family office. The
Act was not designed to regulate the interactions of family
members in the management of their own wealth. Accordingly,
most of the conditions of the proposed rule . . . operate to restrict the structure and operation of a family office relying on
the rule to activities unlikely to involve commercial advisory
activities, while permitting traditional family office activities
involving charities, tax planning, and pooled investing.179
This rationale creates a win-win situation for family offices like Lender
Management who can escape registration from the SEC by managing
family wealth and deduct investment expenses by performing actions
like an investment adviser. This disconnect may not last forever but is
extremely beneficial to family offices that can satisfy this exemption.180
But the rule is not beneficial to all family offices pursuing a Lender
structure. As discussed above, the corollary of Lender and Hellmann is
that family offices should manage the wealth of multi-generational, disjointed families. Families with multi-generational wealth like the Lender
Family will no doubt be able to advise this type of client without having
to register with the SEC. But families compromised of one or two generations of wealth (e.g., a husband, wife, and children) will likely be unable to satisfy the income tax standard because the office would look like
the taxpayer in Higgins. These types of families would be unable to start
a family office that is in a trade or business without advising investments
of non-family members, which would require the family office to register with the SEC. For that reason, families with newer wealth will be less
likely to create a Lender structure because in order to create such a
structure, those families would need to manage outside-the-family
wealth and may need to register with the SEC.
177 KIRKLAND & ELLIS, supra note 6 (discussing the costs of complying with the relevant SEC rules).
178 The SEC rule was an outgrowth of a Senate Banking Committee explanation of
Dodd-Frank, which said that “[t]he Advisers Act is not designed to regulate the interactions of family members, and registration would unnecessarily intrude on the privacy of
the family involved.” Nathan Crow & Gregory S. Crespi, The Family Office Exclusion
Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 69 SMU L. REV. 97, 133 (2016) (quoting the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs).
179 Family Offices, 75 Fed. Reg. 63753-01, 63755 (Oct. 18, 2010).
180 Cf. Emily Cauble, Exploiting Regulatory Inconsistencies, 74 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1895 (2017).
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3. Profits Interest May Create Unsavory Results
Third, the profits interest may create a few adverse tax consequences that may negate any income tax benefit of the deduction.
a. “Deemed Gift” Under Section 2701
A profits interest may trigger a “deemed gift” under section 2701.
This deemed gift applies when the taxpayer retains a preferred equity
interest and transfers a subordinate equity interest to another family
member. In such a scenario, section 2701 could potentially turn a bona
fide profits interest into a deemed taxable gift under a complex valuation formula by valuing the transferor’s retained interest at zero.181
A family office may trigger this gift tax obligation when it receives a
profits interest and the owners of the family office differ from the owners that invest in the family limited partnership. More precisely, the
profits interests must be a “subordinate interest,” which would occur if
other family members that invest in the family limited partnerships hold
onto an “applicable retained interest” that has an “extraordinary payment right” (i.e., a right that “confers a distribution right which consists
of the right to a qualified payment and there are 1 or more liquidation,
put, call, or conversion rights with respect to such interest”).182 Because
partners who receive a profits interest do not receive a liquidation right
with the profits interest, section 2701 may apply.
A recent piece of sub-regulatory guidance suggests that the IRS
would try to argue that section 2701 applies when a family office receives a simple profits interest. In Chief Counsel Advisory 201442053,
the IRS responded to a scenario in which a donor recapitalized an LLC
with her two children where the children managed the LLC and received an interest for “all profit and loss” of the LLC.183 The IRS said
that this type of recapitalization was subject to section 2701 because
“Donor’s interest, which carried a right to distributions based upon an
existing capital account balance, is senior to the transferred interests,
which carried only a right to distributions based on future profit and
181 In short, if the section 2701 rule applies to the profits interest transfer, the value
of the gift is equal to (A) the total value of interest of the transferor and the transferee
post-transfer minus (B) the aggregate amount of property retained by the transferor
(where some of the transferor’s retained interests are deemed to be zero). N. Todd
Angkatavanich, et al., Carrying the Day with Carried Interest Wealth Transfer Planning
for Fund Principals, NYS SOC’Y CPAS (Dec. 1, 2019), http://www.nysscpa.org/news/publications/the-tax-stringer/stringer-article-for-authors/carrying-the-day-with-carried-interest-wealth-transfer-planning-for-fund-principals. This approach contrasts with the
general gift valuation rules that value an interest by trying to approximate what someone
would pay for that gift. Id.
182 I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3)(B).
183 I.R.S. CCA 201442053.
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gain.”184 Although not directly on point, it seems like the IRS would
similarly argue that profits interest like the one in the Lender case
would also be subject to section 2701 because the family office would
receive a profits interest that did not include an immediate distribution
right. But there is much lacking in the IRS’s rationale.
Prominent practitioner Richard Dees argues that the IRS’s memorandum was wrongly decided and did not provide enough explanation to
show how that type of profits interest would be taxable under section
2701.185 Of relevance to this paper, he argued that the capital interest
was not necessarily an applicable retained interest because it did not
necessarily have an extraordinary payment right if the partnership
agreement did not provide for a priority distribution of capital:
As in many private equity partnerships, the amended LLC
agreement might provide that all capital would be distributed
before any profits are distributed. If so, the memorandum is
correct that the distributions of profits would be subordinate to
distributions of capital, although a capital distribution still
would not be a distribution right. . . . The memorandum states
that distributions of capital were permitted, but capital distributions may have been permitted only after all profits were
distributed. If that was the case, the profits interest would be
senior to the capital interest. Alternatively, capital distributions may have been prohibited until the end of the term, at
which time all capital would be distributed pro rata to the
members. The right to participate proportionately in that kind
of liquidating distribution would not be a senior interest or a
distribution right.186
Put differently, Dees argues that a capital interest is not necessarily an
extraordinary payment right, and if it is not one, section 2701 will not
apply. Instead, Dees argues that a simple profits interest (perhaps like
the one in Lender or the CCA from 2014) should not be subject to
2701.187 Under this logic, family offices may be able to plan around section 2701 by providing that the profits interest has priority over the capital interest. This distribution right may be unsuitable because it changes
184

Id.
Richard L. Dees, Is Chief Counsel Resurrecting the Chapter 14 ‘Monster’?, 145
TAX NOTES 1279 (Dec. 15, 2014).
186 Id.
187 Richard L. Dees, Profits Interests Gifts Under Section 2701: ‘I Am Not a Monster’,
123 TAX NOTES 707 (May 11, 2009) (arguing that a “simple partnership profits interest”
should not be subject to gift tax under section 2701 because a “corporate equivalent” of
that structure would not be taxed under the statute).
185
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the economic deal that family members agree to, but it would be preferable from a transfer tax perspective.188
This paper does not solve the puzzle of when section 2701 applies in
the family office context. How the deemed gift rule applies in this situation is inherently a factually intensive question that applies differently to
one family office than it does to other family offices. The bigger point
remains: some family offices may be unable to create a profits interest
structure because section 2701 may trigger a gift tax obligation.
b.

Immediate Taxation if Outside Rev. Proc. 93-27

Profits interest may also create an unexpected taxable event for
family offices. Generally, service providers need to recognize taxable
income equal to the fair market value of any property that they receive
“in connection with the performance of services.”189 Courts have long
struggled with whether a profits interest is immediately taxable upon the
grant of the interest.190 Fearing a circuit split, the IRS released a
favorable Revenue Procedure in 1993 that created a safe harbor for
partnerships granting profits interests.191
The Revenue Procedure said that “if a person receives a profits interest for the provision of services to or for the benefit of a partnership
in a partner capacity,” the granting of a profits interest will not be a
taxable event except in the following situations:
188 Of course, there are two easy fixes to section 2701 in the non-family office context
that likely do not work here. First, the partnership agreement may lock in the interests of
its members and prohibit capital withdrawals. In this case, the other family members who
did not receive a profits interest would not have an “applicable retained interest” because
they would not have a right to a distribution or liquidation. But prohibiting capital withdrawals would weaken the trade or business argument because the Lender court noted
that it was a positive fact that the investors could not pull their money from the family
limited partnerships at any time. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. Second, the
partnership agreement could grant a “vertical slice” of equity in the family limited partnership that “is proportionally the same as the transferred interest.” See Angkatavanich
et al., supra note 181. But this would mean that the partnership would also grant a capital
interest, which would weaken the trade or business argument and result in immediate
taxation to the family office (at ordinary rates).
189 I.R.C. § 83.
190 For example, The Seventh Circuit said that a profits interest “with determinable
market value” was taxable income, but the Eighth Circuit suggested in dicta that a profits
interest was not taxable income. Compare Diamond v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 530 (1971), aff’d,
492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974) with Campbell v. Comm’r, 943 F.2d 815, 823 (8th Cir. 1991).
191 The IRS helpfully defined a profits interest as any interest that is not a capital
interest. Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343. It also said “[a] capital interest is an interest
that would give the holder a share of the proceeds if the partnership’s assets were sold at
fair market value and then the proceeds were distributed in a complete liquidation of the
partnership.” Id.
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(1) If the profits interest relates to a substantially certain and
predictable stream of income from partnership assets, such as
income from high-quality debt securities or a high-quality net
lease;
(2) If within two years of receipt, the partner disposes of the
profits interest; or
(3) If the profits interest is a limited partnership interest in a
“publicly traded partnership” within the meaning of section
7704(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.192
This Revenue Procedure provides clarity and a taxpayer-favorable result to those looking to grant and receive profits interests. But family
offices may be unable to take advantage of this taxpayer-favorable Revenue Procedure in certain situations.
For example, a person providing services to the family limited partnership through a corporation does not fall with the safe harbor and
may be taxed on the grant of the profits interest. Put more directly, the
corporation that receives the profits interest would satisfy the section
83(b) safe harbor, but the person who works for the corporation and
performs services to the partnership would be subject to section 83(a)
because he or she performed services to the family limited partnership,
the property “is transferred to any person other than the person for
whom such services are performed,” and the safe harbor does not apply.
Thus, the owner of the corporation cannot rely on the 1993 Revenue
Procedure and may be subject to phantom taxable income under section
83.
Additionally, the family office may be unable to take advantage of
the safe harbor if the profits interest creates a “certain and predictable
stream of income.” For example, the Lender profits interest was based
on changes in “net asset value,” which would seem to be a certain and
predicate stream of income provided that the family office invests in
assets like equities and bonds that are almost certain to increase in
value. Although it is ultimately a factual finding as to whether the payment from the profits interest is “certain” or “predictable,” this paper
notes that this test may be comparable to the test for disguised fee for
services under section 707(a)(2)(A) and whether the profits interest
lacks significant economic risk. Both tests get at the same issue: did the
partner receive something that is risky and may not come to fruition or
did the partner receive an asset that is virtually certain to bring about
some payments? Only the profits interests that are risky enough can fall
within this safe harbor and avoid immediate taxation.
192

Id.
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c. Capital Gains into Ordinary Income
In addition to creating an income event upon grant, the profits interest that a family office receives may turn capital gain income into
ordinary income. Without a Lender structure, a family would invest
through a series of family limited partnerships. If the partnerships invested in equities or private equity funds, the partnerships would likely
be able to pay tax on any gain at preferential capital gain rates. A family
office that receives a profits interest may also be eligible to pay tax on
gain at preferential capital gains rates. But a family office that structures
its profits interest incorrectly may need to pay tax on this profits interest
at ordinary rates in three situations.
First, as discussed above, if the profits interest lacks significant entrepreneurial risk, the IRS will recharacterize the profits interest as a
disguised fee for management services under section 707(a)(2)(A). In
this situation, part of the profits interest would be ordinary income to
the family office. As Part II explored, lawyers will likely try to create a
profits interest that would create enough significant entrepreneurial risk
to satisfy the disguised fee for services regulations, but not so much that
the profits interest is unlikely to come to fruition. Drafting this type of
profits interest is difficult, especially if the family office cannot estimate
how much money it will make.
Second, a taxpayer that receives a profits interest outside of the
safe harbor discussed above (e.g., if the profits interest creates a “certain
and predictable stream of income”) will need to pay tax equal to the fair
market value of the profits interest at the time of issuance. Although the
profits interest would be a capital asset, the family office would have to
pay ordinary rates because they would not qualify for the long-term
preferential capital gains rate.
Third, section 1061 may turn certain types of gain into short-term
capital gains. This section applies to an “applicable partnership interest”
that is “transferred to . . . the taxpayer in connection with the performance of substantial services by the taxpayer . . . in any applicable trade
or business.”193 Section 1061’s definition of “trade or business” applies
to an entity that invests, develops, or raises capital “on a regular, continuous, and substantial basis,”194 which is potentially broader than the section 162 definition. If a family office sells a profits interest that is
characterized as an applicable partnership interest and is sold within
three years of grant, the family office gain will be recharacterized from
long-term capital gain property into short-term capital gain property.
Advisers need to be cautious to implement a profits interest structure
193
194

I.R.C. § 1061(c)(1).
Id. § 1061(c)(2).
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without addressing these risks. Family offices should weigh the risk of
triggering a gift tax obligation, immediate taxation on grant, and ordinary taxation of profits interest against the benefit of having a profits
interest in the trade or business analysis.
4.

Family Limited Partnerships Will Still Be Unable to Deduct
Investment Expenses

Fourth, families may be unable to deduct outside investment management expenses if those expenses accrue in family limited partnerships and not through the family office. In the Lender case, the Tax
Court said that the family office was engaged in a trade or business but
did not say that the family limited partnerships (M&M, Lenco, or Lotis)
were engaged in a trade or business. The IRS addressed a similar point
in Revenue Ruling 2008-39, which considered a situation where an investor invested in an upper-tier partnership (not in a trade or business)
that in turn invested in a lower-tier partnership (that was in a trade or
business).195 The IRS said that the management fee that the lower-tier
partnership charged the upper-tier partnership would be a section 212
expense because the “entity” theory would apply to whether an entity is
in a trade or business.196
For example, M&M would be unable to deduct any management
fee that it was charged even though Lender Management was able to
deduct its business expenses. M&M economically incurred two types of
management fees: one related management fee and one management
fee from outside private equity funds. Both types of fees would be section 212 expenses and thus not deductible. Nevertheless, most of the
compensation that Lender Management and outside private equity
funds charged M&M was in the form of a profits interest. This compensation is preferable to M&M because the entity would receive less gross
income rather than a larger amount of gross income less a nondeductible section 212 expense. Still, the about 2% management fee is not insignificant in many cases.
Families are likely unable to deduct management fees of outside
private equity and hedge funds even after Lender. In most cases, these
outside investment fees would still be non-deductible section 212 expenses, so creating a Lender structure would not help a family office
unless the office itself has a significant amount of operating expenses.
195
196

1982).

Rev. Rul. 2008-39, 2008-31 I.R.B. 252.
Id. See also Goodwin v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 424 (1980), aff’d, 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir.
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V. CONCLUSION
This article has considered the Lender decision and its impact on
family offices trying to deduct investment expenses. Because the Tax
Court did not adequately address the profits interest of the family office
and did not frame the trade or business analysis in the most persuasive
way, this paper has suggested that a future court may not accept the
rationale of the Lender court. Additionally, this paper highlights several
ways in which a family office that implements a Lender structure may
not benefit as much as they would hope. Implementing a family office
structure may create adverse income tax and gift tax consequences that
may negate any income tax benefit from deducting investment expenses
of the family office.

